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Abstract
In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for
an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard
literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system
on his own. In this note we relax this assumption and provide both necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game under the assumption that the system
as a whole is stabilizable.
Keywords: linear-quadratic differential games, open-loop Nash equilibrium, solvability conditions,
Riccati equations.
JEL-codes: C61, C72, C73.
1 Introduction
In this note we reconsider the linear quadratic differential game to minimize
lim
T→∞





{xT (t)Qix(t) + u
T
i (t)Riui(t)}dt,
subject to the dynamic state equation
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t), x(0) = x0, where (u1, u2) ∈ Us. (2)
Here x(t) ∈ IRn, ui ∈ IR
mi, matrix Ri is positive definite and Qi are symmetric, i = 1, 2.
We assume that the players have an open-loop information structure about the game. That is,
at time t = t0 they have all information about the game, determine their actions, which are then
enforced as binding agreements for the whole planning horizon. Moreover, we assume that players
∗This paper will appear in the proceedings of the CAO’12 conference, September 13-16, Rimini, Italy.
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will play a Nash strategy, i.e., they look for actions that have the property that a unilateral deviation
from these actions makes them worse off.
This problem has been considered by many authors in the past (see e.g. [2] for references). This
problem has been solved under the assumption that every player is capable to stabilize the system by
his own, i.e. the pairs (A,Bi), i = 1, 2, are stabilizable. In this note we will relax this assumption.
We will provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game
under the assumption that the matrix pair (A, [B1 B2]) is stabilizable.
Assuming that the set of control functions considered by the players consists of the following set
Us(x0) =
{





where L2,loc is the set of locally square-integrable functions, i.e.,




we show in the Appendix the next Theorem 1.1.
To that purpose we first introduce some notation. Throughout we will use 0 to denote a zero matrix
that has dimensions that follow from the context where it is used (in particular, in some cases, it may
happen that in fact it does not appear (i.e. it reduces to the empty matrix)). Let Ti be nonsingular
transformation matrices which transform (A,Bi) into its controllable canonical form, i = 1, 2, (see
Lemma 3.1, with ni the dimension of the controllability subspace). Let


















; Q̃i := [Ini 0]T
−1T
i Qi.














If the linear quadratic differential game (1,2) has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial
state, then
1. M has at least n stable eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities). More in particular,









for some Vi ∈ IR
ni×n.




















, the two alge-
braic Riccati equations,
ATi Ki +KiAi −KiSiKi +Q11i = 0, (4)
have a symmetric solution Ki(.) such that Ai − SiKi is stable, i = 1, 2.
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Conversely, if the two algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a stabilizing solution and
vT (t) =: [xT (t), ψT1 (t), ψ
T
2 (t)] is an asymptotically stable solution of













ψi(t), i = 1, 2,
provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic differential game (1,2). 
Notice that the matrices S̃i and Q̃i that appear in M are, in general, not symmetric and the
dimensions of matrices Ai may differ. This is a clear distinction with the standard case considered













Consider the set of (coupled) algebraic Riccati equations
0 = ÃT2 P + PA− P S̃P + Q̃. (6)
Definition 1.2 A solution P T =: [P T1 , P
T
2 ], with Pi ∈ IR
ni×n, of the set of algebraic Riccati equations
(6) is called
a. stabilizing, if σ(A− S̃P ) ⊂ lC−; 1
b. left-right stabilizing2(LRS) if
i. it is a stabilizing solution, and
ii. σ(−ÃT2 + P S̃) ⊂ lC
+
0 ; 
Similar to, e.g., [2] it can be shown that the next relationship between certain invariant subspaces of
matrix M and solutions of the Riccati equation (6) applies. This property can be used to calculate
the (left-right) stabilizing solutions of (6).
Lemma 1.3 Let V ⊂ IRn+n1+n2 be an n-dimensional invariant subspace ofM , and let Xi ∈ IR
ni×n, i =










If X0 is invertible, then Pi := XiX
−1
0 , i = 1, 2, solves (6) and σ(A− S̃P )) = σ(M |V ). Furthermore,
(P1, P2) is independent of the specific choice of basis of V . 
1σ(H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H ; lC− = {λ ∈ lC | Re(λ) < 0}; lC+0 = {λ ∈ lC | Re(λ) ≥ 0}.
2In [2] such a solution is called strongly stabilizing.
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Lemma 1.4
1. The set of algebraic Riccati equations (6) has a LRS solution P T = [P T1 P
T
2 ] if and only if
matrix M has an n-dimensional stable graph subspace and M has n1+n2 eigenvalues (counting
algebraic multiplicities) in lC+0 .
2. If the set of algebraic Riccati equations (6) has a LRS solution, then it is unique.
Proof.









0 −ÃT2 + P S̃
]
.
Since P is a LRS solution, by Definition 1.2, matrix M has exact n stable eigenvalues and n1 +
n2 eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) in lC
+
0 . Furthermore, obviously, the stable
subspace is a graph subspace.
The converse statement is obtained similarly using the result of Lemma 1.3.
2. See, e.g., Kremer [4, Section 3.2]. 
Similar to [2] it can be shown that the next two important corollaries hold.
Corollary 1.5 The infinite-planning horizon two-player linear quadratic differential game (1,2) has
for every initial state an open-loop Nash set of equilibrium actions (u∗1, u
∗
2) which permit a feedback
synthesis if and only if
1. there exist P1 and P2 that are solutions of the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6)
satisfying the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of Acl := A − S1P1 − S2P2 are all
situated in the left half complex plane, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a symmetric solution Ki(.) such that Ai − SiKi is
stable, i = 1, 2.
If (P1, P2) is a set of stabilizing solutions of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6), the actions











PiΦ(t, 0)x0, i = 1, 2, (7)
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation Φ̇(t, 0) = AclΦ(t, 0); Φ(0, 0) = I, yield an open-loop
Nash equilibrium.
The costs, by using these actions, for the players are
xT0Mix0, i = 1, 2, (8)
where Mi is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation





TPi = 0. (9)

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Corollary 1.6 The linear quadratic differential game (1,2) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
for every initial state if and only if
1. The set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6) has a strongly stabilizing solution, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (4) have a stabilizing solution.
Moreover, the unique equilibrium actions are given by (7). 
Remark 1.7 1. In case (A,Bi) is controllable, matrix Ti = In and ni = n. In that case the above
results coincide with the results presented, e.g., in [2][Chapter 7.4].
2. In case (A,Bi) is stabilizable but not controllable, the above results might be used to find the
open-loop Nash equilibria more efficiently from a numerical point of view. For instance, matrix M
in (3) has size (n + n1 + n2) × (n + N − 1 + n2), whereas according the current literature, see e.g.
[2][Theorem 7.11], one has to analyze a 3n× 3n matrix to obtain the equilibria.
3. It can be straightforwardly verified that ψi(t) in Theorem 1.1 coincides with the costate variable
associated with the minimization of Ji (see, e.g., (14)) subject to the state equation (see, e.g.,
(15)). In case (6) has a set of stabilizing solutions it follows that ψi(t) = Pix(t), where x(t) solves




usually (see (9) differs from ψi(0) = Pix0. This implies that the correct shadow price interpretation
of x(t) is provided by 2Mix(t) instead of ψi(t). See, e.g., [1] for more details on this issue.
4. The results can be straightforwardly generalized for the N -player case. All results concerning







where S̃ = [S̃1 · · · S̃N ], Q̃ = [Q̃
T
1 · · · Q̃
T
N ] and Ã2 = diag(Ai). In the next section we will illustrate
this in a 3-player game. 
2 Example
Consider the problem to find the open-loop Nash equilibria for the next three player game. The game
might be interpreted as a debt stabilization problem within a two country setting which engaged in
a monetary union. Within that setting the variables xi(t) can be interpreted as the government
debt, scaled to the level of national output, of country i. ui as the primary fiscal deficit, also scaled
to output, whereas the monetary financing undertaken by the central bank, measured as a fraction
of aggregate output, is denoted by uE. All parameters are assumed to be positive. The welfare

























u2E(t) + βE(ωx1(t) + (1− ω)x2(t))
2dt. (12)
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; QE := βE
[
ω2 ω(1− ω)
ω(1− ω) (1− ω)2
]
; and Si := BiB
T
i , i = 1, 2, E.
Obviously, the pairs (A,Bi), i = 1, 2 are not stabilizable. Consequently we cannot directly use the
standard theory on linear quadratic differential games to find the open-loop Nash equilibria (see e.g.





, TE = I,










α1 0 −1 0 −γ
2
1 −γ1γ2
0 α2 0 −1 −γ1γ2 −γ
2
2
−β1 0 −α1 0 0 0
0 −β2 0 −α2 0 0
−βEω
2 −βEω(1− ω) 0 0 −α1 0
−βEω(1− ω) −βE(1− ω)










By straightforward calculating one can verify that the determinant of M − λI equals




2 + η1s+ η0, where ηi > 0.
So, independent of the sign of ρ2, this sixth order polynomial has 2 sign changes (if one orders it by
descending variable exponent). So according Descartes’ rule of signs matrix M has either two or no
positive real roots. Furthermore, with λ replaced by −λ the corresponding polynomial has 4 sign
changes. By Descartes’ rule M therefore has either 4, 2 or no negative real roots. So, in case det
has six real roots, 2 of them will be positive and 4 of them negative. So, generically, in that case the





equilibria for which the
corresponding equilibrium strategies permit a feedback synthesis.
This is confirmed in case we chose, e.g., x1(0) = 0.7, x2(0) = 1.5, α1 = 0.03, α2 = 0.08, γ1 =
1, γ2 = 0.5, β1 = 0.04, β2 = 0.08, βE = 0.04 and ω = 0.3. In that case matrix M has the
eigenvalues {0.7002, 0.2426,−0.0421,−0.0594,−0.2522,−0.6992}, and it is easily verified that there
are 6 different strategies that permit a feedback synthesis.
By including a discount factor into the cost the number of equilibria reduces. In this example it turns
out that if the discount factor is larger than 12% there will be a unique equilibrium. We calculated
the resulting equilibrium strategies if a discount factor of 14% is used. Then, P1 = [0.1028 −0.0951],

































In this specific case we observe that the central bank responds approximately with a three times
higher monetary policy as the corresponding fiscal authorities to stabilize debt in their country.
Furthermore we see that fiscal authorities negatively respond on a debt that has occurred in the
other country. We plotted both the evolution of debt and control instruments in Figure 1.
From this figure we see that the initially strong monetary policy pursued by the central bank implies
that the country with the initially smallest debt runs into a surplus. Furthermore, after five years
the expansionary monetary financing policy of the central bank is replaced by a small contracting
monetary financing.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the infinite planning horizon open-loop linear quadratic differential
game. We derived under less stringent conditions than in current literature both necessary and
sufficient conditions under which this game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Based on the con-
trollable canonical form of the system we showed along the lines of the proof of [2] that one can
derive Nash equilibria for stabilizable systems similar to the standard case considered in literature.
By determining for each individual player its controllable canonical form, one can derive matrix M
that has a similar structure as in the standard case. Since the size of this square matrix is usually
smaller than 3n it may be advantageous from a computational point of view, also in the standard
case, to use this reduced form to calculate the Nash equilibria. We illustrated the theory in a small
example.
Appendix
First we recall the next well-known controllable state-space decomposition lemma (see e.g. [6, The-
orem3.6]).
Lemma 3.1 Consider the linear system ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), with x(t) ∈ IRn and u(t) ∈ IRm.
Assume the controllability matrix C := [B|AB| · · · |An−1B] has rank n1 (or stated differently the con-
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trollability subspace has dimension n1). Let vi, i = 1, · · · , n1 be n1 linearly independent columns of
C and vn1+1, · · · , vn be such that V := [v1 · · · vn] is invertible. Then, with T := V
−1, x̄(t) = Tx(t)
satisfies ˙̄x(t) = Āx̄(t) + B̄u(t), and (Ā, B̄) have the next properties:











where Ā11 ∈ IR
n1×n1, B̄1 ∈ IR
n1×m and (Ā11, B̄1) is controllable. 
Proof of Theorem 1.1 ”⇒ part” Suppose that u∗1, u
∗














From the first inequality we see that for every x0 ∈ IR
n the (nonhomogeneous) linear quadratic





{xT (t)Q1x(t) + u
T
1 (t)R1u1(t)}dt,
subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u
∗
2(t), x(0) = x0,
has a solution. Notice that by assumption x(t) → 0. So, since this problem has a minimum and
R1 > 0 it follows that u1(t) → 0 too.
From Lemma 3.1 we have that there exists then a state-space transformation x̃(t) = T1x(t) such that








































u∗2(t), x̃(0) = T1x0, (15)









1 . By assumption this minimization
problem has a solution for every initial state. This implies, see [3, Theorem A.1], that the algebraic
Riccati equation





















1 (K1x̃1(t) + m̃1(t)). (16)
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2(s) + Ã12x̃2(s)) +Q121x̃2(s)
]
ds. (17)
By straightforward differentiation of (17) we obtain
˙̃m1(t) = −(A1 − S1K1)
T m̃1(t)−K1(B̃21u
∗
2(t) + Ã12x̃2(t))−Q121x̃2(t). (18)
Next, introduce
ψ1(t) := K1x̃1(t) + m̃1(t). (19)
Using (18) we get
ψ̇1(t) = K1 ˙̃x1(t) + ˙̃m1(t)
= K1(A1 − S1K1)x̃1(t)−K1S1m̃1(t) +K1Ã12x̃2(t) +K1B̃21u
∗











1 (K1x̃1(t) + m̃1(t))−Q121x̃2(t)
= −[Q111 Q121]x̃(t)− A
T
1 ψ1(t). (20)
In a similar way it follows that there exists a state transformation x̂(t) = T2x(t) such that the







































u∗2(t), x̂(0) = T2x0,














2 (K2x̂1(t) + m̂1(t)). (21)










1(s) + Â12x̂2(s)) +Q122x̂2(s)
]
ds, (22)
where K2 is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation













ψ2(t) := K2x̂1(t) + m̂1(t), (23)
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we obtain then similarly as above that ψ̇2(t) = − [Q112 Q122] x̂(t)− A
T
2 ψ1(t). Consequently, with M
as in (3) and vT (t) := [xT (t), ψT1 (t), ψ
T
2 (t)], v(t) satisfies
v̇(t) =Mv(t), with v1(0) := [In 0 0]v(0) = x0.
Since by assumption, for arbitrary x0, v1(t) converges to zero it follows from e.g. [2, Lemma 7.36]
that matrix M must have at least n stable eigenvalues (counting algebraic multiplicities). Moreover,
the other statement follows from the second part of this lemma. Which completes this part of the
proof.























˙̄x(t) = Ax̄(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u
∗(t), x̄(0) = x0.
Using the state transformation x̄ = T1x̃ and notation of the proof of the first part of this theorem
the above problem can then be rewritten as the minimization of (14) subject to the system (15).
Since, by assumption, the algebraic Riccati equation (4) has a stabilizing solution, according [2,
Theorem 5.16], the above minimization problem has a solution. This solution has the same structure
as the solution advertised in (16,17). The only difference is that u∗2(t) satisfies in this case (24). For
that reason we will use the notation m1(t) instead of m̃1(t) in (16,17). Introducing
ψ̃1(t) := K1x̃(t) +m1(t),




1 ψ̃1 and similar to (20) we get that
˙̃
ψ1 = −[Q111 Q121]x̃(t)− A
T
1 ψ̃1.

















































1 ψ1(t)− (−[Q111 Q121]x̃(t)−A
T
1 ψ̃1(t)),






































is the Hamiltonian matrix associated with the algebraic Riccati
equation (4). Recall that the spectrum of this matrix is symmetric w.r.t. the imaginary axis. Since
by assumption the Riccati equation (4) has a stabilizing solution, we know that its stable invariant
subspace is given by Span[I K1]













for some vectors vi, i = 1, 2. However, it is easily verified that due to our asymptotic stability
assumption both xd(t) and ψd(t) converge to zero if t→ ∞. So, v2 must be zero. From this it follows
now directly that p = 0. Since the solution of the differential equation is uniquely determined, and
[xd(t) ψd(t)] = [0 0] solve it, we conclude that x̃(t) = T1x(t) and ψ̃1(t) = ψ1(t). Or stated differently,
u∗1 solves the minimization problem.
In a similar way it is shown that for u1 given by u
∗
1, player two his optimal control is given by u
∗
2.
Which proves the claim. .
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